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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Matthew

Charles

Askew

appeals

from

the

district

court's

order

relinquishing jurisdiction following a period of probation.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2006, Askew pied guilty to grand theft by possession of stolen property
and was given a suspended seven-year sentence with two years fixed, and
placed on probation for seven years.

(R., pp.61-64, 67-70.) Over three years

later, the state filed a motion for a probation violation, alleging Askew violated his
probation by (1) driving under the influence, (2) consuming/possessing alcohol,
(3) frequenting an establishment where alcohol is the main source of revenue,
and (4) consuming/possessing alcohol (on a different date than alleged in the
second allegation). (R., pp.92-94.) Askew admitted allegations two, three, and
four, but before his disposition hearing, he was arrested for possessing HGH
(human growth hormone). (R., pp.99-100, 107-108.)
The state filed a second motion for a probation violation based on the
HGH that was seized from Askew's residence during a probation search. (R.,
pp.122-124.)

However, that allegation was dismissed on the state's motion at

the outset of the dispositional hearing on Askew's first set of probation violations.
(R., pp.127-131.)

On August 26, 2010, the district court reinstated Askew's

probation and ordered him to follow any treatment recommendations made by his
probation officer. (Id.)
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On November 22, 2010, Askew was arrested on an agent's warrant and
subsequently alleged to have violated his probation by (1) committing the crime
of delivering a controlled substance, (2) committing a second crime of delivering
a controlled substance, and (3) committing the crime of manufacturing a
controlled substance. (R., pp.132-138, 143-145.) Askew admitted the first and
second allegations, and the third allegation was dismissed at the state's request.
(R., pp.158-159.)

The district court revoked Askew's probation, imposed his

original sentence, and retained jurisdiction for one year. (R., pp.162-166.) The
court also ordered Askew to successfully complete the one-year Therapeutic
Program, and informed him that if he failed to do so, he would be sent to prison.
(R., p.163.)
On December 20, 2011, after receiving a recommendation by the North
Idaho Correctional Institution that the court relinquish jurisdiction (Addendum to
the PSI ("APSI")), the district court signed an order relinquishing jurisdiction over
Askew and remanding him to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections
for execution of judgment.

(R., pp.167-168.)

Askew filed a pro se Rule 35

motion for reduction or correction of his sentence (R., pp.169-173), and the state
filed an objection to that motion (R., pp.191-193). The district court appointed
counsel to represent Askew in his Rule 35 proceeding (R., p.187), and counsel
filed another Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence with a supporting brief (R.,
pp.194-199). On February 29, 2012, the district court entered an order denying
Askew's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.205-207.) Askew timely appealed. (R., pp.208210.)

2

ISSUES

Askew states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Askew due process
and equal protection when it denied his motion to augment
the appellate record with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Askew's Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in light of the
mitigating factors present in this matter?

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Askew failed to establish the Idaho Supreme Court violated his due
process and equal protection rights by denying his motion to augment the
appellate record with irrelevant transcripts?

2.

Has Askew failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
relinquishing jurisdiction?

3.

Has Askew failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction or correction of sentence?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Askew Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His Due
Process And Equal Protection Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The
Appellate Record With Irrelevant Transcripts
A.

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Askew filed a motion to augment

with four as-yet unprepared transcripts consisting of two probation violation
admit/deny hearings, and two probation violation dispositional hearings. (Motion
To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support
Thereof, filed July 31, 2012 (hereinafter "Motion").)

After the state filed an

objection to the Motion (8/3/12 Objection to "Motion to Augment [etc.]"), the Idaho
Supreme Court denied Askew's Motion. (Order, filed 8/13/12.)
Askew now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has effectively
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.515.)

Askew has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights,

however, because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts are even
relevant to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issue over which thfs
Court has jurisdiction on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
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review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

Askew Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentation
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however,
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper,
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient,
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his
ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d
229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893
(1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To
show prejudice, Askew "must present something more than gross speculation
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that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Ela, 302 F.3d 598,
605 (6 th Cir. 2002). Askew has failed to carry this burden.
Because Askew did not file his Rule 35 motion (filed January 20, 2012)
within 14 days of entry of the district court's December 20, 2011 Order
Relinquishing Jurisdiction (see R., pp.67-70; I.C.R. 54.3(a)), his March 2, 2012
notice of appeal is timely only from the court's February 29, 2012 "Order Denying
Motion to Reduce Sentence and Order Correcting Credit for Time Served" (R.,
pp.205-207). Inasmuch as Askew's appeal is timely only from the order denying
his Rule 35 motion, that is the only issue over which the appellate court has
jurisdiction. See,~. State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct.
App. 1996) (a timely filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to appellate
jurisdiction); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983) (same).
Nevertheless, Askew sought to augment the appellate record with (1) a
transcript of the probation violation admiUdeny hearing held on June 10, 2010,
(2) a transcript of the probation violation dispositional hearing held on August 26,
2010, (3) a transcript of the probation violation admiUdeny hearing held on
January 20, 2011, and (4) a transcript of the probation violation dispositional
hearing held on March 24, 2011. (Motion, pp.1-2.) Askew argues that the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his
motion to augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared transcripts,
however, he has failed to adequately explain, much less demonstrate, how
transcripts of probation violation hearings relate to the only issue on appeal -- his
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
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Askew contends "the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues of
whether the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction and
denied his I.C.R. 35 motion because the district court could rely on its memory of
the probation revocation hearings when it decided to relinquish jurisdiction."
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

Despite Askew's argument, because the as-yet

unprepared probation violation transcripts were never presented to the district
court in relation to the Rule 35 motion at issue in this case, they were never part
of the record before the district court and are not properly considered for the first
time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972,
974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal,
the appellate court is "limited to review of the record made below" and "will not
consider new evidence that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v.
Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of
this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and consider new evidence.").
Moreover, because Askew's appeal is untimely from the district court's
Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, that order cannot be challenged on appeal. To
the extent Askew's request for transcripts relates to such a non-cognizable issue,
it is misplaced. As to the remaining contention that the district court's memory of
the probation revocation proceedings may have affected its decision to deny
Askew's Rule 35 motion, Askew does not explain where the record gives any
indication that the court in fact relied on its memory of specific aspects of those
proceedings in denying his Rule 35 motion.

Before Askew filed his Rule 35

motion, the court relinquished jurisdiction over him "[b]ased upon the Report from
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the Department of Corrections[.]" (R., p.167-168.) In that same vein, when the
court denied Askew's Rule 35 motion, it stressed, as it had promised (see R.,
p.163), Askew's failure to succeed in the retained jurisdiction program,
explaining:
Defendant has been given numerous opportunities to
rehabilitate. Yet he continues to commit serious violations of law.
In spite of his substantial criminal history the court gave him the
benefit of a retained jurisdiction. During that program he was
unable to exhibit a change in his thinking, attitude, or behavior. At
a time when he should have been on his best behavior, he failed
the rider. During probation on this case, he committed another
felony. The court will not reduce the sentence.
(R., p.206.) Although the district court noted that Askew had committed another
felony during probation, it gave no hint that it was considering anything specific
that occurred during the probation violation hearings as supportive of its decision
to deny the Rule 35 motion. Askew has failed to provide any cogent reason the
requested transcripts may have been relevant or necessary for reviewing the
district court's decision denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence
following the court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and executing sentence.
Askew further contends, citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218
P.3d 5, 8 (Ct App. 2009), that "the transcripts of the hearings at issue are
relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following
sentencing when determining whether the court made appropriate sentencing
determinations." 1 (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) The state recognizes the Idaho Court
of Appeals' statement in Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 8, that

1

For purposes of this argument, the state assumes, arguendo, that a Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence is a "sentencing determination."
8

appellate "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period
of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed
as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of
probation." Contrary to Askew's assertions, however, Hanington does not stand
for the proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to relinquish
jurisdiction and order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in
the appellate record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court
presided. To the contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that
evidence was presented at prior hearings and that the district court relied on
such evidence in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not
entitled to transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the
date probation was finally revoked. 2 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194
(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or all
of the stenographic transcript . . . will not be germane to consideration of the
2

In the recently decided (non-final, yet to be released for publication) decision
by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Morgan, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 2782599
*3 (Idaho App. 2012), relied upon here as instructive, the Court explained:
Morgan asserts that this Court's decision in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), requires a
review of the entire record of proceedings in the trial court up to and
including the revocation of probation. Morgan reads Hanington too
broadly. As stated in Hanington, in reviewing the propriety of a
probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily confine ourselves to only
those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the
revocation of probation. Id. at 28, 218 P.3d at 8. However, that
does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and
including sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the
conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation.
Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the
trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are
properly made part of the record on appeal.
9

appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496
("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the
State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate
appellate review.").
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of prior probation violation hearings to fully review
the denial of a Rule 35 motion, Askew has failed to show that any such
circumstances apply here.

There is nothing provided by Askew that would

indicate that what happened at the prior hearings, held between 11 and 20
months before the issuance of the decision that is at issue on appeal, was
considered or played any role in the district court's decision to deny Askew's
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. Accordingly, Askew has failed to
show such transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this
appeal.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Askew claims he is
only required to make a "colorable argument" that he "needs items to complete a
record on appeal" before the burden transfers to the state "to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) He
also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide him (and
all indigent defendants) "with an appellate record unless the State can that [sic]
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's
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Brief, p.7; see also p.5 ("[T]he only way a court can constitutionally preclude an
indigent defendant from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the
transcript is irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal.").) No reading of Mayer
supports these legal arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.

lfL. at 190. The appellate court denied his request for

a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government
expense only for felonies.

lfL. at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was

entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

lfL. at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar

issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that
the government need not provide transcripts that were not "'germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper,
372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record

where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be
available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way."

lfL. at 195.

"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on
those grounds."

lfL.
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Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

~

at

194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate.

~

at 194-95. See also

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Here the only proceeding challengeable on appeal is Askew's Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence.

The record related to the district court's

decision is already complete because all of the evidence considered by the
district court for that motion is before the appellate court. It is Askew's appellate
burden to establish that the requested transcripts are necessary to create an
adequate appellate record to review the order denying his Rule 35 motion. The
augmentation he sought, however, was of never before prepared transcripts
hearings held 11 and 20 months before the district court rendered the decisions
at issue in this case.

Nothing in the record even suggests that the requested

transcripts (or anything contained therein) were before the district court in relation
to the Rule 35 motion.

Because Askew failed to make a showing of

germaneness and colorable need for the requested transcripts, there is no
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burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before the district court is in the
appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate review, and Askew has
failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. 3 Strand, 137 Idaho at
463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Askew has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection.
Askew cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.7-11 (citing, ~ .
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record
that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Askew's request
for transcripts solely because he is indigent. In fact, Askew's motion would have
properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the transcripts. The
Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a
ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested.

I.A.R. 30.

Askew's

motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden, imposed
upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even helpful in
addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied
the motion to augment because Askew failed to make a showing that any

3

As a component of his due process claim, Askew argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-17.)
Because Askew has failed to show that the requested transcripts are necessary,
or even relevant, for appellate review of the district court's order denying his Rule
35 motion, there is no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has
deprived Askew of effective assistance of counsel on this appeal.
13

appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the record as
requested. There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment would have
been granted had Askew been paying for the requested transcripts; the rule
applies to all parties, not just the indigent.
Askew has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the
record amply demonstrates that Askew's motion to augment with the requested
transcripts was properly denied because he failed to show that the transcripts
were necessary for adequate review of the district court's decision deny his Rule
35 motion.

Because Askew has failed to show his due process and equal

protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by the denial of his motion
to augment, he has failed to show any basis for relief.

11.
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Consider The District Court's Order
Relinquishing Jurisdiction
Askew argues that "the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished its jurisdiction." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) However, because Askew
did not file his appeal within 42 days after entry of the district court's Order
Relinquishing Jurisdiction (R., pp.167-168), and because the filing of his Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence did not extend the time to appeal, his appeal is
untimely from the relinquishment order and this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider an appellate challenge to that order.
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An appeal as a matter of right may be perfected "only by physically filing a
notice of appeal ... within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp ...
on any judgment, order or decree of the district court appealable as a matter of
right .... " I.AR. 14(a) {emphasis added); see also I.C.R. 54.3.

However, if a

Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is filed within 14 days after the entry of
a judgment, the time to appeal "commences to run upon the date of the clerk's
filing stamp on the order deciding such motion."

I.C.R. 54.3(a).

The district

court's Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction was filed on December 20, 2011. (See
R., pp.67-70.) Therefore, unless Askew extended his appeal time by filing his
Rule 35 motion by January 3, 2012, he had until January 31, 2012 to file an
appeal from the relinquishment order.

However, Askew's January 31, 2012

appeal deadline was not extended because he waited until January 20, 2012 to
file his Rule 35 motion - well beyond the 14 day period required by I.C.R.
54.3{a). Askew filed his notice of appeal on March 2, 2012 (R., pp.208-210),
over one month after his January 31, 2012 appeal period expired; therefore, it
was untimely.
Inasmuch as Askew's appeal is not timely from the district court's Order
Relinquishing Jurisdiction, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider an
appellate challenge to that order. See Payan, 128 Idaho at 867, 920 P.2d at 83;
Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190.

Therefore, Askew's second issue on

appeal (see Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19) must be dismissed.
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111.
Askew Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of His Sentence
A.

Introduction
After Askew was placed in the retained jurisdiction program, the district

court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered his sentence executed because he
failed to complete the Therapeutic Community program as ordered. (R., pp.167168.) Askew filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district
court denied. (R., pp.169-173, 194-195, 205-207.) On appeal, Askew contends
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.19-22.) A review of the record shows otherwise.

B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Askew must "show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

C.

kL.

Askew Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In Light Of The
Marginal New Information Provided In His Rule 35 Motion
Askew asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied

his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-22.)

Askew has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
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A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a
sentence is excessive.

Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27, 218 P.3d at 7.

Those

standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any reasonable view of
the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal
punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).
Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728,
730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing
events before and after the original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218
P.3d at 8.
Askew specifically argues that the information provided by his Rule 35
motion was mitigating because it demonstrated:

(a) he has a job opportunity

available to him after his release, (b) he was in a 12-step (substance abuse)
program, (c) his fiance was pregnant and needed his emotional and financial
support, (d) he learned a lot on his rider and gained insight into his criminal
behavior, (e) he provided the court with a treatment plan and treatment course
for his issues with anxiety, (f) he had strong support from his family, and (g) he
suffers from ADD, bi-polar disorder, and suicidal thoughts.

(Appellant's Brief,

p.21.) Askew also contends that he made some progress during his retained
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jurisdiction period, and was not considered a disciplinary problem. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.18-19, 20 (Section II mitigating information incorporated into Section 111
argument).)

Askew has failed to satisfy his burden of showing an abuse of

discretion in light of the information provided by his Rule 35 motion. Review of
the record shows Askew's Rule 35 motion contained little, if any, actually new
information, and what information was provided was entirely consistent with the
evidence already considered and merely reinforced the district court's sentencing
rationale.
Askew pied guilty to grand theft by possession of stolen property for
possession of stolen checks, which crime was described in the presentence
report ("PSI") as follows:
According to the appended police reports, on December 26, 2005,
Boise Police were dispatched to a break in at Lush Salon, 109
North 1ih, Boise. The front window was shattered and the salon
ransacked. It initially appeared the suspect stole one bottle of Bud
Light beer 'from the refrigerator and exited the back door. A witness
provided information that led police to Matthew Charles Askew.
Contacted by police, Mr. Askew admitted wearing a black coat the
night of the burglary. Inside the pocket was a book of checks
belonging to the Lush Salon. Broken glass was found in the tread
of the shoes Mr. Askew said he wore that night and around the
bottom cuff of a pair of pants.
(PSI, p.2; see R., pp.61-64; Tr., p.1, L.19 - p.2, L.7.)

At sentencing, after

considering both the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating evidence, the
district court gave Askew the opportunity to succeed on probation. (Tr., p.16, L.1
- p.23, L.14; R., pp.67-70.)

Askew twice failed to abide by the terms of his

probation (R., pp.99-100, 158-159), yet the court still gave him the opportunity to
successfully complete a period of retained jurisdiction, emphasizing that he
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complete the one-year Therapeutic Community program (R., pp.162-166).
However, Askew failed to complete that program due to his own recalcitrance, as
explained by the Department of Correction's updated report and recommendation
to the district court:
After review of his institutional performance, program participation,
probation plan, and central file, ML Askew is recommended for
Relinquish Jurisdiction. This recommendation was based on the
following information: Mr. Askew was not a significant disciplinary
problem; however he continually violated the smaller rules of the
TC and was unwilling or able [sic] to change his thinking, attitude,
or behavior. Mr. Askew has not adequately demonstrated a desire
to stop his harmful behavior or thinking. Staff used numerous
interventions in the TC and in his assigned group to help him
change his behavior and thinking; to include several staffings with
and without Mr. Askew present; however, all of these attempts
failed. Mr. Askew did not complete his assigned programs. He
also did not submit what appeared to be a reasonable probation
plan with a confirmed living arrangement, and his efforts in the
program did not appear to be sincere regarding his willingness to
change his criminal thinking and behavior.
(APSI, p.4.)

Askew's failure to make an appropriate effort to complete the

Therapeutic Community program during his retained jurisdiction period was the
last straw for the district court -- Askew failed at each of the three opportunities
given him to continue on probation.
The information provided in the Rule 35 motion, even taken as true, does
R., pp.169-173, 194-195.)

not change the court's analysis.

There is

nothing changed or new about Askew having a job opportunity at the time of his
Rule 35 motion (vis-a-vis his sentencing hearing), because he had been actively
employed in one job for about a year-and-a-half at the time of sentencing, and
his employer was present at that hearing to show his support. (Tr., p.19, L.24 p.20, L.3; PSI, pp.7-8.)

Askew's supportive family, as well as his bi-polar,
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anxiety, and ADD issues were also considered during his sentencing hearing and
do not constitute new information. (Tr., p.17, L.16 - p.23, L.2; PSI, pp.5-6, 9-11.)
Admittedly, the pregnancy of Askew's fiance and her need for financial and
emotional support, his recent involvement in a 12-step program, his new
treatment plan to address anxiety, and the things he learned from his "rider," was
all new information at the time of his Rule 35 motion.

However, none of that

information would have had any meaningful impact on the court's decision to
deny the motion because they do not change the balance of community
protection, deterrence, and rehabilitation from that employed by the court. As the
court concluded in denying Askew's Rule 35 motion:
Defendant has been given numerous opportunities to
rehabilitate. Yet he continues to commit serious violations of law.
In spite of his substantial criminal history the court gave him the
benefit of a retained jurisdiction. During that program he was
unable to exhibit a change in his thinking, attitude, or behavior. At
a time when he should have been on his best behavior, he failed
the rider. During probation on this case, he committed another
felony. The court will not reduce the sentence. . ..
The sentence imposed will provide an appropriate
punishment and deterrent to the defendant and to the community.
(R., p.206.)

Askew has failed to show any abuse of discretion. The district court had
already given significant weight to the mitigating evidence at the time of
sentencing and determined it appropriate to initially place Askew on probation,
and despite his failure to comply with the terms of his probation on two
successive grants of probation, the court gave him one last chance to continue
on probation by placing him in the rider program to complete the Therapeutic
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Community program. Given Askew's history of failing to succeed when given the
opportunity of probation, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
his original sentence of seven years with two years fixed executed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Askew's Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
DATED this 20 th day of November, 2012.
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